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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Unlike the transaction in the principal case, the preferred stockholders
may have no control over the management of the business. In such
a situation it would not be wise to disallow the carryover simply
because fifty per cent of the carryover benefits went to the new,
preferred stockholders. It is clear that any satisfactory solution to
such problems requires a thorough re-examination of the purpose and
function of loss carryovers in tax law.
HUSBAND'S IMMUNITY FROM PERSONAL SUIT
FOR TORT
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for injuries which
were intentionally inflicted by her former husband subsequent to the
initiation of divorce proceedings. The complaint alleged that defend-
ant, with intent to kill plaintiff and in violation of a non-molesta-
tion order, repeatedly rammed plaintiff's automobile with his own.
Defendant challenged plaintiff's right to sue, claiming immunity from
suit by his former wife for personal tort occurring during marriage. The
trial court granted judgment for defendant on the pleadings, which was
affirmed on appeal. Held: A man is immune from suit in tort by his
former wife, even though the tort was intentional and was inflicted
after divorce proceedings had been initiated. Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan.
701,401 P.2d 1012 (1965).
At common law a married woman had no legal existence separate
from that of her husband, and could bring no cause of action against
him.' Married Women's Property Acts were enacted in an attempt to
alleviate this common law inequity by granting the wife the right to
manage her own property and to sue in her own name. For the most
part, these acts do not deal explicitly with the question of personal torts
between spouses.' A majority of courts interpret this silence as limiting
the wife's right to sue her husband to property questions.' An increasing
number of jurisdictions, however, permit recovery for some or all
I Under the medieval concept of unity, the husband and wife were "one person in
law, so that the very being and existence of the woman is suspended during cover-
ture .... ." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 889 (Lewis ed. 1898).
2 Only New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin provide specifically for personal
tort suits between spouses. N.Y. Dom. REL. LA w § 57; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1
(1963); Wis. STAT. § 246.075 (1955). Illinois specifically forbids tort actions between
spouses. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1953). See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
3 McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vn.L. L. REv. 303, 313-14
(1959). The wife's disability to sue her husband for personal tort was considered to be




personal torts.' By affirming application of the immunity doctrine in
the principal case, the Kansas Supreme Court perpetuated a rigid,
sterile, and outmoded view of the judicial process.
The court in the principal case considered itself bound by an earlier
Kansas decision which had denied damages for injuries negligently
inflicted by a husband upon his wife.' The court then considered several
proffered factual bases for distinguishing the earlier case, but found
that the factual situations were not sufficiently different to "require the
application of a different principle of law." The court decided that the
intentional nature of the tort did not warrant an exception to the gen-
eral common law rule of immunity. That divorce proceedings were
underway was considered immaterial by the court, for the marriage
remained technically in effect and thus required application of the
immunity doctrine. Finally, the court declared that any change in the
doctrine was not within the realm of its authority, but lay only with the
legislature. Two judges dissented, finding the earlier case clearly dis-
tinguishable. They would have permitted recovery by recognizing that
the tort in the principal case fell within the scope of exceptions pres-
ently recognized in other jurisdictions.
The court in the principal case was not bound by stare decisis to
apply the earlier rule denying recovery. A more recent decision' had
held that suit could be maintained between spotifses for a negligent tort
committed before marriage, although at common law the marriage
would have extinguished all existent rights of action. That court had
recognized that Kansas had statutorily rejected the rule requiring
strict interpretation of statutes in derogation of common law,' and gave
4 Courts in seventeen jurisdictions permit actions between spouses for any nature
of personal tort. Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932) ; Cramer v.
Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37
S.W2d 696 (1931) ; Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70
(1962) ; Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935) ; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103
Conn. 583, 131 At. 432 (1925); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953);
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blake, 94 N.H. 141, 47 A,2d 874 (1946); Coster v.
Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118
S.E. 9 (1923) ; Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W.526 (1932); Damm
v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E2d 337 (1952) (dictum); Court-
ney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938) ; Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129,
166 S.E. 101 (1932) ; Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941) ; Taylor
v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954) (intentional injury, but immunity
abolished as to all torts) ; Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 210 N.W. 822
(1932). Wisconsin has also held that Arizona permits recovery, although there are no
Arizona cases in point. Jaeger, v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W2d 740 (1952). See
PRossER, ToRTs 883-85 (3d ed. 1964); McCurdy, supra note 3.
5 Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952).
60 'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P2d 285 (1964), 14 KAN. L. REv. 124 (1965).
7 The common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial deci-
sions, and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of
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liberal effect to the statute which granted married women the right to
sue.' Thus, the court in the principal case had before it recent authority
for the proposition that the statute allowing suit should be liberally
construed. In the absence of any indication that the legislature had
intended otherwise, the court in the principal case could have effected a
liberal interpretation of the statute and granted to the wife a right to
sue.
Although the court's unwillingness to accept an argument based
solely on statutory construction might be justifiable for policy reasons,'
its express refusal to consider recently-recognized judicial exceptions
to the judicially-created immunity doctrine constitutes abdication of its
responsibility. As pointed out in dissent, the alleged tort in the princi-
pal case was intentional, which would serve adequately to distinguish
the negligent tort of the earlier case.' When the marriage relationship
has disintegrated even before the tort occurred, as in the principal case,
there is even less reason to perpetuate the immunity doctrine. The
unity of person concept, the traditional argument advanced in support
of the immunity doctrine, is no longer extant in Kansas. 1 Nor was there
domestic harmony to maintain in the principal case, for divorce pro-
ceedings were pending when the tort was executed. 2 Although it is true
the General Statutes of this state; but the rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any gen-
eral statute in this state, but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to pro-
mote their object. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 77-109 (1949).
8 "A married woman may, while married, sue and be sued in the same manner as if
-he were unmarried." KAN. GEN. STAT. § 23-203 (1949). As stated by the court,
"It is clear when a Kansas statute has been enacted which reasonably covers a common
law subject matter, such statute will prevail, it being entitled to a liberal construction."
O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285, 288 (1964). The court also took note
,f a "guideline for interpretation" laid down in a previous case involving married
wvomen's rights: "The one-person idea of the marriage relation as expounded by the
common-law authorities can no longer be made the touchstone of a married woman's
right or capacities in this state. Her powers and responsibilities do not depend upon
the principle of unity, but upon the principle of diversity." Harrington v. Lowe, 73
Kan. 1, 20, 84 Pac. 570, 578 (1906).
0 The court may have felt that acceptance of plaintiff's argument for a liberal con-
struction would have necessitated the overruling of Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239
P2d 933 (1952), which it was unwilling to do.
"o Cf. Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949), in which it was held
that an action would lie under the Idaho Married Women's Act under circumstances
similar to those in the principal case. Oregon has distinguished between negligent and
intentional torts between spouses, permitting recovery only for the latter. Compare
Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955), with Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore.
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
11 See note 8 supra.
'It has been argued that the injured party has sufficient redress through criminal
prosecution and divorce, and that immunity is necessary in order to preserve domestic
peace and tranquility and prevent frivolous or collusive claims. In Goode v. Martinez,
58 Wn. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961), 37 WAsH. L. REv. 233 (1962), in which divorce
was pending at the time an alleged assault by the husband took place, the court con-
sidered each of these reasons and rejected them. With regard to criminal prosecution
19661
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that the legal aspect of the relationship survived, a bare legal relation-
ship cannot sustain the harmonious character of a functioning mar-
riage."
The most disturbing factor in the principal case is the court's deci-
sion that it could not deal with the problem, and that the duty of change
lay solely with the legislature. This position is not in accord with sound
judicial thinking, ignores the realities of the situation, and conflicts
with a previous Kansas decision.' 4 Immunity doctrines are the product
of common law courts; 5 without regard to statutory authority the court
in the principal case had power to modify this judicially-created doc-
trine." The Kansas Bill of Rights guarantees a remedy for every injury
"by due course of law." The decision in the principal case denies that
remedy to the plaintiff. Even if the legislature were moved by the
decision in the principal case to abrogate inter-spousal immunity, the
plaintiff would still be denied her remedy; legislative acts, as opposed
to judicial decisions, can seldom be applied retroactively.
In reality, there is little prospect of reform legislation." The victims
of the immunity rule form no identifiable lobby group to push for
enactment. Further, legislatures are reluctant to initiate change when
the court appears satisfied with a doctrine of its own making. An
assumption by the legislature that the court will overrule an unjust but
judicially-created doctrine is just as reasonable as the court's assump-
tion that the legislature, by its inactivity, has condoned it. In the
circumstances of the principal case a creative judicial role would not
have conflicted with the legislature, and might even have stirred legis-
lative activity.
it noted: "A criminal action may be adequate to prevent future wrongs, but it cer-
tainly affords no compensation for past injuries." Id. at 234, 361 P.2d at 944. Cf.
Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949). See also 38 WAsH. L. REv. 371
(1963).
13 Cf. Goode v. Martinez, 58 Wn. 2d at 235, 361 P2d at 945 (1961):
Where only "the shell of the marriage contract" remains, we find no justification,
at least in the present context, for determining the legal rights of the parties as
if nothing had ever happened to interrupt their marital relations. To do other-
wise is to ignore the realities of the situation and indulge in a fanciful assump-
tion ....
14 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
15 "It is a general principal that for negligent or tortious conduct, liability is the
rule. Immunity is the exception to the rule, created by the courts which have applied
it." Noel v. Menninger Foundation, supra note 14, 267 P.2d at 942.
16 In Noel, the court rejected any assertion that it must wait for legislative action,
and-quoting the Washington Supreme Court-said, "We closed our courtroom doors
without legislative help, and we can likewise open them." Ibid.
'7 This is the conclusion reached by Prof. Peck, following a survey of legislation
in the field of tort law. Peck, The Role of the Court and Legislatures in the Reform
of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963).
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